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The Bedrock of Individual Rights in
Times of Natural Disaster
DIANE P. WOOD*
Hurricane Katrina blasted into the Gulf Coast of the United
States on August 29, 2005,1 thirteen days short of the fourth anniver-
sary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Thirteen days after
the Katrina disaster, on September 24, 2005, Hurricane Rita hit this
still-suffering area of the country.2 The aftermath, both in human and
economic terms, is well known.3 For a time, chaos reigned, especially
in New Orleans and the surrounding area. Even today, New Orleans
continues to suffer from the effects of the storms, its population cut in
half, and its economic base devastated.4 Similarly, residents of Hous-
ton, a city also affected by the storms of 2005, acknowledge their rela-
tive good fortune, yet still recall with horror the twelve to twenty-four
hour ordeals they endured while attempting to comply with official
orders to evacuate.' In the three years since the storms, the Nation
has had a chance to reflect upon the legal implications of disasters,
both natural and manmade. For some time, the tension between the
rule of law and threats posed by terrorists and other hostile entities
has been apparent. Comparable tensions exist, however, when the ur-
gency at hand stems from a natural event, such as a hurricane, a pan-
demic, or a fire.
* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1. See National Climatic Data Center, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Climate of 2005 Summary
of Hurricane Katrina, http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/researchl2005/katrina.html.
2. Shaila Dewan & Jere Longman, Hurricane Slams into Gulf Coast; Flooding Begins, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at All.
3. For an excellent survey of these events and the law relating to them, see generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND (2006).
4. Stephen Ohlemacher, Katrina's Louisiana Legacy: A Half-Abandoned Region, THE
STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 22, 2007, at 12.
5. Ralph Blumenthal, Storm and Crisis: The Overview; Miles of Traffic as Texans Heed
Order to Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at Al.
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A brief review of the essential elements of the rule of law con-
firms that the courts play a central role in its creation and mainte-
nance. If courts are unavailable or unable to function, as was the case
following Hurricane Katrina, little stands between the citizenry and
the breakdown of the rule of law.6 After setting the stage, therefore,
this article then looks at what steps the courts have taken, since Ka-
trina, to assure continuity of operations. Assuming that the courts
have managed to stay open and inform the public of any alternative
arrangements that may be in place, the question becomes: what
problems, if any, have been rendered nonjusticiable because of the
exigencies of the emergency? Finally, in deciding whether courts are
prepared or permitted to address a problem, it is useful to identify the
greatest potential conflicts with individual rights that can arise in these
troubled situations.
Open for Business: The Rule of Law and the Courts
In an earlier paper, entitled The Rule of Law in Times of Stress,7 I
discussed the extent to which the United States has, or has not, ad-
hered to the rule of law during times of insurrection, foreign wars, or
other threats to national security. That paper used the following
working definition of the "rule of law":
[T]he rule of law has both a substantive and a procedural dimen-
sion; .. there is no one in a society governed by law who is above
the law or immune from some form of legal constraint; . . . neither
laws nor the procedures used to create or implement them should
be secret; and ... the laws must not be arbitrary.8
Perhaps the most important part of the procedural dimension of
the rule of law is the existence of "instrumentalities of impartial jus-
tice," 9 meaning courts that use fair procedures. 10
The State Department of the United States takes much the same
approach to the concept of the rule of law. Its Office of International
Information Programs identifies the following characteristics of states
that follow the rule of law:
6. See Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Courts Closed by Hurri-
cane Katrina, http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/hurricane2.html.
7. See Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455 (2003).
8. Id. at 457.
9. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997).
10. Id.
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[1] Rule of law means that no individual, president or private citi-
zen, stands above the law. Democratic governments exercise au-
thority by way of law and are themselves subject to law's
constraints.
[2] Laws should express the will of the people, not the whims of
kings, dictators, military officials, religious leaders, or self-appointed
political parties.
[3] Citizens in democracies are willing to obey the laws of their so-
ciety, then, because they are submitting to their own rules and regu-
lations. Justice is best achieved when the laws are established by the
very people who must obey them.
[4] Under the rule of law, a system of strong, independent courts
should have the power and authority, resources, and the prestige to
hold government officials, even top leaders, accountable to the na-
tion's laws and regulations.
[5] For this reason, judges should be well trained, professional, in-
dependent, and impartial. To serve their necessary role in the legal
and political system, judges must be committed to the principles of
democracy.
[6] The laws of a democracy may have many sources: written consti-
tutions; statutes and regulations; religious and ethical teachings; and
cultural traditions and practices. Regardless of origin, the law
should enshrine certain provisions to protect the rights and free-
doms of citizens:
[i] Under the requirement of equal protection under the law, the
law may not be uniquely applicable to any single individual or
group.
[ii] Citizens must be secure from arbitrary arrest and unreason-
able search of their homes, or the seizure of their personal
property.
[iii] Citizens charged with crimes are entitled to a speedy and
public trial, along with the opportunity to confront and question
their accusers. If convicted, they may not be subjected to cruel
or unusual punishment.
[iv] Citizens cannot be forced to testify against themselves.
This principle protects citizens from coercion, abuse, or torture,
and greatly reduces the temptation of police to employ such
measures.
11
Characteristics Four and Five are the areas of greatest concern
for present purposes; each addresses the need for a system of strong,
11. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, PRINCIPLES OF DEMOC-
RACY: THE RULE OF LAW, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/principles/lawrule.pdf.
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independent courts staffed by independent and impartial judges who
are committed to the principles of democracy.
The American Bar Association further highlighted the need for
strong courts during times of peril in the Twelve Principles entitled
Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster that it adopted in August
2007.2 Principles Two, Three, and Four are particularly important to
this discussion. Principle Two stresses that:
It is the duty of all legal organizations-the courts, the organized
bar, prosecutors, public defenders, providers of legal services to the
poor, individual lawyers, police, and prison and jail officials-to un-
dertake adequate planning and preparation to insure that the legal
systems, both civil and criminal, can continue to dispense justice in
times of major disaster.' 3
Principle Three establishes a number of steps that courts, in par-
ticular, should take "[i]n planning, preparing, and training for a major
disaster."' 4 This Principle emphasizes, above all, that courts must re-
main open for business. Furthermore, courts must be in a position to
do their work properly. Legal records and evidentiary materials must
be preserved; alternative physical facilities should be available, relying
on inter-jurisdictional sharing if necessary; and judicial personnel
should be deployed where they are most needed. Further, Principle
Four states, without qualification, that "the requirements of the Con-
stitution must be respected, particularly with respect to criminal pros-
ecutions. '"15 Many of these goals will be difficult to achieve if a
natural disaster has the effect of shutting down regular courts in the
affected area.
In the related area of military justice, the principle is well estab-
lished that extraordinary tribunals, such as military commissions, are
not authorized to operate if the normal courts are open for business.
For example, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,'6 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that Colonel William Winthrop, whom it regarded as the author
of the definitive treatise on military law, 7 included as one of the pre-
12. AM. BAR Ass'N, RULE OF LAW IN TIMES OF MAJOR DISASTER (2007), http://www.aba
net.org/litigation/ruleoflaw/rol-disaster.pdf.
13. Id. at 3 (commentary for Principle Two).
14. Id. at 4 (commentary for Principle Three).
15. Id. at 5.
16. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
17. Id. at 2777. Colonel William Winthrop was an Assistant Army Judge Admiral General,
law professor, and author of a treatise on military law that was first published in 1896 and is still
highly regarded today. Col. William Winthrop's Retirement: By It the Army Will Lose a Very
Able Assistant Judge Advocate General, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1895, available at http://query.ny
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conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by a military tribunal the
criterion that "the trial must be had within the theatre of war; that, if
held elsewhere, and where the civil courts are open and available, the
proceedings and sentence will be coram non judice.'1 8 In fact, this
principle was first and most famously expressed in Ex parte Milligan,1"
in which the Supreme Court held that the laws and usages of war
could "never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the
authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their
process unobstructed."" ° The Court went on to observe that Indiana
was such a state, and therefore Milligan's military trial was contrary to
law."t Similarly, just after the conclusion of World War II, in Duncan
v. Kahanamoku,2 the Court held that two men who had been tried by
military tribunals in Hawaii during the course of the war were entitled
to be released on the ground that Congress had not authorized such a
sweeping use of military power in the Hawaiian territory. 3 In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Black hinted at the outcome by phrasing
the relevant question as follows:
Have the principles and practices developed during the birth and
growth of our political institutions been such as to persuade us that
Congress intended that loyal civilians in loyal territory should have
their daily conduct governed by military orders substituted for crim-
inal laws, and that such civilians should be tried and punished by
military tribunals?24
Not surprisingly, he answered that question in the negative, pro-
claiming that "[c]ourts and their procedural safeguards are indispensa-
ble to our system of government. They were set up by our founders to
protect the liberties they valued. ' '2 5
There is no reason why the same rule mandating use of the nor-
mal civil courts, unless they have shut down, should not apply to areas
struck by a natural disaster. Although it may be necessary, during
times.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?-r=l&res=9404E3D8103DE433A25753C3A9619C94649ED7
CF&oref=slogin.For treatise citation, see infra note 18.
18. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 n.29 (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 836 (rev. 2d ed. 1920)) (internal quotations omitted). Coram non judice means
"outside the presence of a judge" or "before a judge or court that is not the proper one or that
cannot take legal cognizance of the matter." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 338 (7th ed. 1999).
19. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
20. Id. at 76.
21. Id. at 83.
22. 327 U.S. 304 (1946
23. Id. at 324.
24. Id. at 319.
25. Id. at 322.
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times of emergency, for authorities to assume full control for the area,
in the interest of the rule of law every effort must be taken to assure
that such a period is as brief as possible. That said, the question of the
role of the courts in ensuring that emergency powers stay within legal
boundaries is a difficult one, which is addressed in Part III of this arti-
cle. The courts can do nothing, however, unless they remain open for
business. Recognition of this fundamental point has led courts around
the country to develop "continuity of operations plans," or COOPs.
Continuity of Operations in the Courts
The purpose of any court's continuity of operations plan is plain:
to facilitate the court's ability to carry out its essential functions dur-
ing periods when use of its ordinary facilities is threatened, dimin-
ished, or utterly blocked because of a disaster of any type.26 Perhaps
the most important part of any COOP is clarity; clarity in how and
when it should be triggered, and how and when it should be termi-
nated. Second-and a close second-is the effectiveness of the com-
munication systems for which the COOP provides. As America
learned, to its sorrow, during both the September 11th attacks and the
Katrina disaster, lack of communication can hamper or even cripple
the most well-meaning responsive efforts. Internal communications
among court personnel are critical to maintaining or re-establishing
functioning courts, but external communications to other governmen-
tal authorities and the public at large are just as important. If the
police do not know who can issue a warrant or where that person is
located, they face the Hobson's choice of ignoring the Fourth Amend-
ment or foregoing a criminal investigation for which they have proba-
ble cause. If the public does not know what has happened to the
courts, people may resort, in desperation, to chaotic self-help
measures.
The Administrative Office (AO) of the U.S. Courts has helped
federal courts around the country devise appropriate COOPs for
themselves. Following advice given in a Federal Preparedness Circu-
lar, the AO identified six critical elements for any plan: (1) essential
functions, (2) delegations of authority, (3) orders of succession, (4)
alternative facilities, (5) interoperable communications, and (6) vital
26. See generally R. ERIC PETERSEN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS AND CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLANNING IN THE FEDERAL JUDICI-
ARY (2003), http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31978_0808
2003.pdf.
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records and databases.27 Not all disasters require the same type of
response, of course, and so there is a debate among planners about
what type of response is appropriate for each situation. One school of
thought takes the position that one COOP is enough, as long as it is
flexible. Attempting to prescribe for the future in too much detail is
risky. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example,
which is headquartered in New Orleans, had engaged in substantial
planning after the 9/11 attacks and had decided that its alternate base
of operations would be Lafayette, Louisiana. That decision was one
of the earliest casualties of Hurricane Katrina. The court abandoned
the plan to use Lafayette and instead promptly decided to move its
base of operations to Houston, Texas.28 Its earlier plan had failed to
anticipate the need for the entire court staff, complete with their fami-
lies, to relocate to a different city for a substantial period of time.
However accommodating the facilities may have been in Lafayette,
they were better in Houston-indeed, the then-sitting Chief Judge
was based in Houston, as were several other members of the court.
Further, the court was accustomed to occasional sittings in Houston.
The process of planning is itself educational for all who are involved,
and those who urge that a COOP should be one unified, relatively
general plan, believe that this education plus the general outlines of a
solution are all that can be expected.
The other school of thought advocates alternative plans.29 On a
geographical planning axis, one could imagine at least four scenarios:
The courthouse building alone is affected, e.g., the 1995 bomb-
ing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City;30
27. See Court Continuity of Operations Plans Get Assist, THE THIRD BRANCH NEWSLETTER
(Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), July 2002, available at http://www.us
courts.gov/ttb/july02ttb/essentials.html; Fifth Circuit First to Gauge Emergency Preparedness,
THE THIRD BRANCH NEWSLETTER (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Apr.
2002, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/apr02ttb/papertrail.html#gauge.
28. See Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Courts Regrouping After
Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 08, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/hurricane090805.html.
29. Of course, for security reasons, I cannot go into detail about any particular court's
COOP. In general, however, the plans are careful to provide for numerous alternatives. If the
primary courthouse is unavailable because of physical destruction, contamination, or inability to
travel to it, then a COOP will provide for City B as an alternate location. If the emergency
affects City B as well, then Cities C and D are named. If the natural disaster, for example, is an
influenza pandemic, as opposed to a fire that destroys the courthouse building, the plan might
provide for networking among the judges of the court and court personnel, minimizing the need
to assemble in person.
30. Thomas A. Birkland & Carrie A. Schneider, Emergency Management in the Courts:
Trends After September 11th and Hurricane Katrina, 28 JUST. Sys. J. 20, 21 tbl.1 (2007).
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The courthouse and the immediate vicinity might be damaged,
e.g., the flooding of the Chicago River in April 199231 that affected
most of Chicago's downtown area known as the Loop;
A defined geographic region is affected, e.g., what could have
happened as a result of the March 28, 1979 incident 32 at the Three
Mile Island nuclear power plant if radiation had escaped and con-
taminated a large area; and
A complete government shutdown or unavailability, e.g., imag-
ine a temporary shutdown of the nation's communication networks
or power grid.
On an alternate axis, one might plot types of disasters ranging
from terrorist attacks and pandemics to weather-related disasters such
as hurricane, tornadoes, or floods, or other types of natural disasters
like earthquakes and fires. While there may be a risk in allowing
plans to become too complex, the fact remains that the solutions to
these different problems are likely to vary significantly. When Hurri-
cane Katrina hit New Orleans, it made perfect sense for the court of
appeals to relocate, en masse, to Houston, and for the district court to
relocate to Baton Rouge. If the problem were a pandemic, however, a
different plan would be required, one enabling people to work while
they remain largely isolated from one another.
In an article discussing the issue of emergency management in
courts, authors Thomas A. Birkland and Carrie A. Schneider highlight
a number of problems that have arisen in the past, which plans should
be designed to address in the future.33 Apart from the need to keep
the courts open, or to leave them closed for the shortest possible time,
courts must relocate to areas that are readily accessible to the public,
as well as to court employees, litigants, witnesses, jurors, and law en-
forcement officers who must appear in court.34 Courts must also keep
their records and evidence secure to avoid lengthy postponements of
proceedings, or worse, dismissals for inability to prosecute. 35 Addi-
tionally, COOPs must address a court's ability to monitor probation-
31. The facts of the 1992 flood are described briefly in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 530 (1995), and then again in Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 260 F.3d 789, 790-91 (7th Cir. 2001).
32. For a brief description of the nuclear incident that resulted in the release of radioactive
materials into the atmosphere and the subsequent evacuation of thousands of residents who
lived in the surrounding area, see In re Three Mile Island Litigation, 87 F.R.D. 433, 434 (D.C. Pa.
1980).
33. Birkland & Schneider, supra note 30, at 20.
34. Id. at 23-26.
35. Id. at 25 (In the aftermath of Katrina, "[e]vidence in approximately 3,000 criminal cases
pending before the court system was lost, and many witnesses and victims had left the city, and
[VOL. 51:747
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ers, parolees, and others subject to outstanding court orders; and
finally, key information must flow to "stakeholders," including parties
before the court, the public, law enforcement officers, and detainees
and prisoners.36
Learning a lesson from Katrina, COOPs now regularly anticipate
the need for inter-jurisdictional cooperation, whether from one fed-
eral circuit or district to the next, from one state to the next, or from
one city to the next. Professor Farber and Dean Chen ask the ques-
tion whether federalism was a friend or a foe in addressing the Ka-
trina catastrophe.37 The answer seems to be a combination of both.
One thing that federalism certainly offers is redundancy; in a crisis,
that redundancy can be enormously useful. If a federal courthouse
has been destroyed, the judges might be able to move to another part
of town and use the state courthouse. If state prisons have been
flooded, there will be a federal prison or a prison from a sister state
available to take the inmates on a temporary basis. The states are
party to an Emergency Management Assistance Compact,38 which
provides the legal underpinning for many of these cooperative mea-
sures. Federal statutes such as the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act 39 provide the basis for federal assistance to
states struck by disasters, and the federal government has direct au-
thority to render assistance to federal facilities that are affected by a
disaster.
Justiciability During Emergencies
Having a continuity plan to keep the courthouses open during a
crisis is critical, but that alone is not enough. People seeking judicial
services must have standing to sue, and the questions they present
must be capable of judicial resolution. In times of emergency, one or
both of these prerequisites to judicial action may be missing.
As the Supreme Court noted recently in Lance v. Coffman:"°
even one year later, many had not returned. As a result, many cases were delayed or dismissed
for lack of witnesses.").
36. During the Katrina crisis, detainees and prisoners received especially bad treatment.
For an indepth discussion of the civil and human rights violations on the Gulf Coast during and
after Katrina, see ACLU, BROKEN PROMISES: 2 YEARS AFrER KATRINA (2007), http://www.aclu.
org/pdfs/prison/brokenpromises 20070820.pdf.
37. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 3, at 19.
38. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877
(1996).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2005).
40. 127 S. Ct. 1194 (2007).
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Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to "Cases" and "Controversies." One component of the
case-or-controversy requirement is standing, which requires a plain-
tiff to demonstrate the now-familiar elements of injury in fact, cau-
sation, and redressability. "We have consistently held that a
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about govern-
ment-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large-does not state an Article III case or controversy., 41
Generalized grievances, the Court repeatedly emphasizes, belong in
the political branches of the government.
Under this doctrine, citizens with only a general objection to the
declaration of a state of emergency or to the details of the emergency
regime might be unable to challenge those arrangements in court.
The only parties who will be permitted to go forward are those who:
(1) have a particularized grievance, (2) have suffered "injury in fact,"
(3) can show that the government's action has caused that injury, and
(4) are asking for some type of relief the court is capable of granting.42
The last of those requirements may be the most difficult since it is
quite unlikely that a court would tell a quasi-military commander how
to maintain order, second-guess a governor's decision to implement
an evacuation order, or step into other details of emergency
governance.
The potential restrictions stemming from the separation of pow-
ers among the branches of government are even more important than
standing limitations. In Baker v. Carr,4 3 the Supreme Court recalled
its previous position in which it said that:
In determining whether a question falls within the [political ques-
tion] category, the appropriateness under our system of government
of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and
also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are
dominant considerations. The nonjusticiability of a political ques-
tion is primarily a function of the separation of powers.4 4
Although the Court in Baker went on to note that not every ques-
tion touching on foreign relations, dates of duration of hostilities, va-
41. Id. at 1196 (quotations and internal citations omitted).
42. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1990).
43. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
44. Id. at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)) (alteration in origi-
nal)(internal quotations and citations omitted).
[VOL. 51:747
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lidity of enactments, the status of Indian tribes, or the existence of a
republican form of government is nonjusticiable, it acknowledged that
many are.45
One of the areas the Court mentioned is of particular relevance
to natural disasters: dates of duration of hostilities. The Baker Court
reviewed the reasons for the judiciary's reluctance to intervene in this
area:
Though it has been stated broadly that the power which declared
the necessity is the power to declare its cessation, and what the ces-
sation requires, here too analysis reveals isolable reasons for the
presence of political questions, underlying this Court's refusal to re-
view the political departments' determination of when or whether a
war has ended. Dominant is the need for finality in the political
determination, for emergency's nature demands [a] prompt and un-
hesitating obedience. Moreover, the cessation of hostilities does not
necessarily end the war power. [Rather, it has been stated] that the
war power includes the power to remedy the evils which have arisen
from its rise and progress and continues during that emergency. But
deference rests on reason, not habit. The question in a particular
case may not seriously implicate considerations of finality-e.g., a
public program of importance (rent control) yet not central to the
emergency effort. Further, clearly definable criteria for decision
may be available. In such case the political question barrier falls
away: A Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mis-
take, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is
declared. It can inquire whether the exigency still existed upon
which the continued operation of the law depended. On the other
hand, even in private litigation which directly implicates no feature
of separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards
and the drive for even-handed application may impel reference to
the political departments' determination of dates of hostilities' be-
ginning and ending.46
These comments carry over directly to natural disasters. Included
among the issues that may arise are the power of the Governor or the
President: (1) to characterize a particular event or series of events as
an emergency or a major disaster, (2) to determine the scope of the
emergency, (3) to decide on the measures that are necessary to deal
with the emergency, (4) to specify which, if any, of the ordinary laws
should be suspended while the emergency persists, and (5) ultimately
45. Id. at 211-19.
46. Id. at 213-14 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 51 Howard L.J. 757 2007-2008
Howard Law Journal
to decide when the emergency has abated sufficiently to permit the
return of ordinary legal structures. Just as there is a need in the face
of hostilities for "a prompt and unhesitating obedience,"47 there may
well be a period of time when the same imperative exists in the face of
a Katrina-like disaster. Similar to the Court's tradition of refusing to
second-guess the political branches' "determination of when or
whether a war has ended,"48 courts will be wary of trying to decide
when or whether an emergency has ended, or when a natural disaster
and its aftereffects are over.
A quick review of the statutes that confer power on the Executive
Branch to declare the existence of an emergency or natural disaster
shows that they lack the kind of standards the courts would be able to
apply. The Stafford Act 49 is currently the primary disaster relief stat-
ute that authorizes the federal government to intervene in these ur-
gent situations. Section 5170 permits the President, upon the request
of the Governor of the affected state, to declare that a "major disas-
ter"5 exists.51 Section 5191 provides the same authority for the Presi-
dent, upon the request of the Governor of the affected state, to
declare that an "emergency 52 exists. The statutes provide little
more than a circular definition for these two terms. For the most part,
they simply spell out that a "natural disaster" or "emergency" is
whatever the President declares it to be, and then they outline the
procedures for obtaining a Presidential declaration and the types and
terms of assistance that the federal government may offer. These stat-
utes also provide the. necessary statutory authorization for deploy-
47. Id. at 213.
48. Id.
49. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2005).
50. A "major disaster" is defined as:
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind
driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide,
snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part
of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chap-
ter to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and
disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.
42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2008).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2008).
52. An "emergency" is:
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assis-
tance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and
protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a
catastrophe in any part of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2008).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2008).
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ment of military personnel in an area affected by an emergency or
major disaster; absent these statutes, the Posse Comitatus Act forbids
the use of "any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus
or otherwise to execute the laws."54 Another exception appears in the
Insurrection Act,55 which permits the President, upon the request of a
state's legislature or governor if the legislature cannot be convened, to
call into federal service the militia of other states or the armed forces
in order to quell the insurrection.
Though they would not normally be used in natural disasters, the
National Emergencies Act (NEA),56 and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),57 also provide guidance. The NEA
empowers the President, acting under appropriate legislation, to de-
clare a national emergency during the time it exists.58 Interestingly,
this statute also provides for the termination of a national emergency,
if: "(1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution [of Congress] termi-
nating the emergency; or (2) the President issues a proclamation ter-
minating the emergency."59 In addition, each House of Congress is
supposed to review all declarations of national emergency every six
months to see whether the emergency should be terminated.6" Fi-
nally, the NEA requires the President and Executive agencies to
maintain "a file and index of all significant orders,"'" rules, and regu-
lations issued pursuant to the national emergency declaration, and to
transmit that information, if need be, to Congress promptly and
confidentially.62
IEEPA applies to any unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if
that threat "has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States . . The President first must declare a national
emergency with respect to the threat, and then he or she may exercise
the powers granted in IEEPA as well.6 4 The President's powers are
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2008).
55. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-34 (2008).
56. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51 (2008).
57. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2008).
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2008).
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2008).
60. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (2008).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (2008) (discussing President's accounting and reporting
requirements).
62. 50 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2008).
63. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2008).
64. Id.
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very broad, as a quick look at section 1702 reveals. They include the
authority to regulate financial flows between the United States and
other countries; the power to investigate, regulate, or block acquisi-
tions by foreign nationals; and the right to confiscate property held by
foreign persons (broadly defined)." Interestingly, the statute ad-
dresses judicial review, even though it purports to be neutral on the
topic. In one section, the statute confers immunity from suit: "No per-
son shall be held liable in any court for or with respect to anything
done or omitted in good faith in connection with the administration
of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, this chapter, or any regulation,
instruction, or direction issued under this chapter."66 In another sec-
tion, addressing classified information, it states: "In any judicial re-
view of a determination made under this section, if the determination
was based on classified information . . . such information may be sub-
mitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection
does not confer or imply any right to judicial review." '67 Later, follow-
ing the same approach as the National Emergencies Act, IEEPA re-
quires the President to file regular reports with Congress about his or
her use of IEEPA.68
It is impossible to say, in the abstract, whether the political
branches are entirely beyond the reach of the courts as soon as the
President utters the magic words "emergency" or "major disaster."
One can always imagine far-fetched hypotheticals: a President de-
clares an emergency for bona fide reasons, but refuses to acknowledge
that the crisis has passed and seeks to continue the exercise of ex-
traordinary powers; faced with wildfires in Southern California and a
request from California's Governor for disaster assistance, a President
decides instead to put the entire State of California under military rule
until an upcoming national election is over; and so on. The first line of
defense is surely in Congress, which has a variety of powers that could
be used to rein in such abuses. Whether the courts also have a part to
play is less clear, but depending on the facts, the injury suffered by the
plaintiff, and the relief sought, they might.
More realistically, most emergencies or natural disasters will not
require wholesale displacement of civil authorities. Courts will re-
main open, or will reopen quickly under their emergency plans. Ordi-
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (2008).
66. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3) (2008).
67. Id. at § 1702(c) (emphasis added).
68. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (2008).
[VOL. 51:747
HeinOnline  -- 51 Howard L.J. 760 2007-2008
The Bedrock of Individual Rights in Times of Natural Disaster
nary police will have jobs to do, even if military personnel assist them.
Citizens may have grievances against the emergency authorities or
amongst themselves, but in all but the most grievous situations, the
courts should be able to respond to these grievances and uphold the
rule of law. The final section of this article speculates about the kind
of problems that might arise during the pendency of the emergency
and its aftermath.
Conflicts with Individual Rights
Here, as is often the case, it is useful to draw a rough line be-
tween substantive rights and procedural rights. Natural disasters can
threaten a wide range of substantive rights, including freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, public access to information, religious
freedom and tolerance, recognized limits on police power (such as the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches), the right
to privacy, freedom of movement or the "right to travel", and eco-
nomic and property rights such as the right against governmental tak-
ings that are not for a public purpose or that are not accompanied by
proper compensation. Procedural rights are equally important, and
vulnerable. Without notice and opportunity to be heard before an im-
partial tribunal that will follow the rule of law, there is a greater risk
of erroneous governmental action. Furthermore, when the govern-
ment must justify its actions in public, prosecutors or enforcement au-
thorities will think more carefully before they institute a proceeding.
If administrative rights are in danger of being revoked, the affected
citizen should ideally be given the opportunity to present the equities
of her case to the decision-maker.
The rule of law itself suffers when government operates in secret,
in haste, and without accountability from an independent adjudicator.
We disparage dictators and strongmen in other countries who treat
their citizens in this way. Our concern must be just as great when the
normal protections of the rule of law are suspended temporarily dur-
ing a natural disaster in the United States. One analogy that may
point the way toward a solution to these problems is found in the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III of which
permits the Attorney General to authorize wiretaps. 69 Title III re-
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2008). For present purposes, the amendments to this statute
made by the PATRIOT Act are unimportant. See, e.g., PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§§ 206, 214, 216, 2001 HR 3162 (2008).
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quires that wiretapping or electronic surveillance "be conducted in
such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter .. ."0 This is
often referred to as the Title III minimization requirement.
In my view, the idea behind the Title III minimization require-
ment can and should be extended to virtually all measures that
abridge individual rights during the time of an emergency. One must
be practical about the exigencies of a true emergency, but it is equally
essential not to compromise the values embodied in the rule of law.
Upon a proper challenge by a person individually affected by a partic-
ular measure, the responsible authority should either explain why the
measure was essential, or modify the measure to be more carefully
tailored to the need at hand. If the measure is too sweeping, or if it
has been in effect longer than the crisis to which it was addressed,
there should be a way of complaining to the responsible authority and
obtaining redress. Perhaps, in extreme cases, there is a role for the
courts, even during the emergency. If not, either across-the-board or
in particular cases, then following the model of the confiscations made
by the Alien Property Custodian during World War II,71 there may be
a way of permitting after-the-fact compensation for parties whose
rights were unlawfully infringed.
Courts should also be able to continue operations for any and
every function not directly addressed by the emergency authority. Or-
dinary police work will continue, and if magistrates are available, the
police should still obtain warrants for arrests, searches, and seizures.
Racially discriminatory practices such as ethnic or religious profiling
are no more accurate or justifiable during an emergency than at any
other time. This is not to say, however, that the competent emergency
authority would never be able to justify other forms of nondiscrimina-
tory checkpoints, queries on the part of the police, and preventive
measures.72 Free speech can be equally imperiled during an emer-
gency. The government has a strong interest in ensuring that accurate
information reaches as many people as quickly as possible, but that
cannot be a justification for censorship. Natural disasters, by defini-
tion, are less likely to implicate national security concerns than disas-
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2008).
71. See generally Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
72. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (highway checkpoints for drunk
driving and illegal immigration); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (random
drug testing of student athletes); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (roadblock to verify
drivers' licenses and vehicle registration permissible).
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ters like the Oklahoma City bombing or the September 11th attacks.
Once again, the message is that measures designed to restore order
should minimize intrusions on personal freedom to the greatest extent
practicable.
CONCLUSION
The rule of law in times of natural disaster cannot sustain itself
without careful attention to its requirements. Although every branch
of government and every official share the responsibility of acting in
accordance with the rule of law, the courts stand in a special position.
Courts have begun the important work of developing plans to ensure
that they will be open for business during even the worst natural disas-
ter, and that the public will know how to reach them. More attention,
however, is needed regarding the way in which emergency measures,
ordered by executive authorities, might interact with background legal
norms, and to the ways in which society can require those executive
authorities to respect the rule of law even during time periods when
courts cannot or should not act. On-the-spot remedies may not be
practical or appropriate, but, as Congress has shown in the National
Emergency Act and IEEPA, there are ways in which authorities can
be required to operate transparently. There may also be kinds of af-
ter-the-fact remedies available to vindicate the rights of those who did
not receive their due. Knowing that such remedies might be invoked
in the future, public actors will have an incentive to observe the rule
of law even during the worst hours of an emergency. Natural disasters
will, unfortunately, visit us from time to time, but if we meet them
without panic, with dignity, and with fidelity to our fundamental rights
and values, they will pass without lasting damage.
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